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Even where the testator has specified a time within which the
executor is to sell, "the power (to sell) does not cease because of a
failure to exercise it within the time prescribed, and it may be
exercised after the expiration of the period in the absence of a
clear expression to the contrary." 8 But if the power of sale is given
for a specified purpose which no longer exists, the executor may not
sell thereafter.'
The personal representative is, of course, subject to individual
liability for failure to make disposition or distribution of the personalty within the proper time. As a rule he must make good the
loss to the estate. Thus for example, an executor who held cotton
for fourteen to twenty months hoping to get better prices, while
the price thereof was steadily dropping, was surcharged with the
loss.' In In re Tyson's Estate' the administrator was charged the
difference between the inventory value of certain jewelry and the
amount realized on the sale of it.
CLARENCE CORNELIUS

CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOING OF
AN ACT THEORY OF JURISDICTION
Until comparatively recently, the traditional categorical bases'
by which jurisdiction is obtained in actions in personam had been:
first, by the presence of the defendant within the state; secondly, by
the allegiance or domicile of the defendant;' and thirdly, by the consent of the defendant.' But with the integration of business into
large, incorporated units, and with the ever-increasing ease of travel
between the states, the traditional means of obtaining jurisdiction
became inadequate in the light of the new problems raised.
An early evidence of such inadequacy appeared in the corporation cases. As the law on obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations developed, the courts first attempted to apply one of the traditional theories, namely that service could be effected by consent.
The initial argument stated that a corporation had domicile only in
'
Note 31 A. L. R. 1394, 1395 (1924).
'Id. at 1405.
Pulliam v. Pulliam, Ex'r, 10 Fed. 53 (1881).
80 Pa. Super. Ct. 29 (1922).
'See Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, (1926) 39
Harv. L. Rev. 563 at 569, 570.
'Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1872). Under the traditional
theory of "presence", a sub-classification is presented by the general
appearance cases (see York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct. 9
(1890)).
'Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S.421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252 (1932).
The domicile cases also come logically under the traditional allegiance
basis.
' Glbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931); Beale,
The Jurisdictionof Courts Over Foreigners, (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev.
193.
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the state of its incorporation,' and that another state might exclude
it entirely unless certain conditions were met. Consequently it was
made a condition to the corporation's doing business in the state that
its consent to defend suit be given. But the weakness of this argument appeared in the inability of the court to point out the actual
giving of consent, either objectively or subjectively,' and it was finally
vitiated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Flexner v. Farson7 when he pointed
out that:
. ..
The consent that is said to be implied in such cases
[where the nonresident defendant is a corporation] is a mere
fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the state could
exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could
establish this obligation as a condition to letting them in."
The second attempt of the courts to nationalize jurisdiction over nonresident corporations was founded upon the traditional theory of
"presence". Discarding the doctrine that a corporation can be
present only in the state of its incorporation, the argument advanced
on the assumption that conducting business continuously in another
state amounts to the presence of the corporation within the boundaries of that state for the purpose of service, so that service upon an
agent of the corporation is valid.'
But the employment of each of these traditional bases was such
a fictional fabrication that the courts apparently were not satisfied
by resort to consent or presence as justifications of the desired result.
Hence a new theory evolved, namely the "doing of an act" doctrine,
under which the fictional element might be excluded. The conclusion reached was that since a state may, without violating any constitutional limitation, forbid a foreign corporation to do business in
the state until it has consented to the jurisdiction of its courts as to
causes of action arising out of the business, the state may therefore
provide that the doing of acts which constitute continuous business
shall subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of its courts as to
such causes of action.
The doing of an act concept, thus conceived, required the doing
of more than one particular act, and it would seem evident that the
widest application which the theory might possibly have would be an
instance in which there is not enough activity to constitute continuous
business in the ordinary sense. Such a case is Stevens v. Television,
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 33 U. S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 404 (1865).
'Old Wayne Mutual Life Ins. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup.
Ct. 236 (1906); Bagdon v. Reading Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075
(1916).
Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 293, 39 Sup. Ct. 97 (1919).
'Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915
(1916); for a case arising in Kentucky see: International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944 (1913).
'Scott, JurisdictionOver Nonresident Motorists, (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 563.
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Inc?" Here the defendant foreign corporation made a few sales in
New Jersey, but was not doing business continuously, and, upon
investigation by the authorities, the defendant and its agents left the
state. In seeking an injunction, the attorney-general, in accordance
with a statute providing substituted service for corporations acting
within New Jersey, and on the direction of the court, served the
defendant corporation personally outside the state on an in personam
claim. On special appearance the court held that service based upon
the doing of an act, namely the making of sales within the state, was
sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction.
The corporation cases were not the only object to which the
doing of an act theory was applied, for, with the increase of automobile transportation and the growing dangers to persons and property resulting from the negligent operation of vehicles on the highways, a need was presented for statutes subjecting nonresident motorists to the jurisdiction of courts at the locus of the wrong. Here,
again, the well-established principle of jurisdiction by presence was
not available, for the nonresident had left the state. The basis of
allegiance was of no avail for the allegiance of the defendant was
toward another sovereign. So New Jersey enacted the first nonresident motorist statute upon the idea of consent, requiring the nonresident motorist upon entering the state to execute an express consent appointing the secretary of state as agent, with whom service
might be left in actions arising out of a defendant's negligent operation of his automobile on the public highways. '
But Massachusetts, profiting from the introduction of the doing
of an act theory into the corporation cases, later passed a statute providing that the act of using its highways on the part of a nonresident
motorist constituted an implied appointment of the registrar of motor
vehicles as the agent of the nonresident upon whom service might
be made."
The last and most recent step in the development of the doing of
an act principle arose in the individual enterpriser cases, as an extension of the foreign corporation and the nonresident motorist rules.
In the case of Doherty & Co. v. Goodman the defendant, a New York
individual, operated his business by designating an agent in Iowa to
sell securities. A controversy arose and process was served on the
agent under a statute providing that a corporation or individual might
be served for actions arising out of the business by delivery of process to its agent where the corporation or individual was not a resident of the county in which the cause of action was created. Meeting the defendant's claim of discrimination by saying that the statute
affected residents of other counties of Iowa just as much as it did the
21111 N. J.
'Discussed
(1916).
"Discussed
(1927).
1, 294 U. S.

Eq. 306, 162 Atl. 248 (1932).
in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30
in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632
623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553 (1935).
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residents of other states, the court held, on special appearance, that
the defendant, through the act of establishing an agency within the
county, voluntarily appointed his own agent by the force of the
statute to receive substituted service in actions in personam growing
out of that agency. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in reaching the
same result on its hearing of this case,' had subscribed to the view
that the "true rule" is laid down by the Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws, citing section 90:
"A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an
individual who has done an act or caused an event within the
State, as to a cause of action arising out of such an act or event,
if by the law of the state at the time when the act was done, a
person by doing the act or causing the event subjected himself
to the jurisdiction of the state as to such cause of action.'"'
In retrospect and by way of observation, then, it would seem that
the growth and development of the doing of an act theory was fostered
by the influence of practical necessity. From a pragmatically philosophical standpoint it would seem to be axiomatic that where there is
more than one theory which may be applied to a given situation, the
one which is legally the most correct and which also reaches the most
expedient result is most worthy of adoption. Since the doing of an
act theory fulfills these requirements, it would seem most worthy of
adoption. Furthermore, there would seem to be no theoretical or
practical obstacle to applying the doing of an act doctrine with just
as great a force in the case of nonresident motorists or individual
enterprisers as it has been applied in dealing with corporations.
What objections then might be offered to the continued development of the doing of an act doctrine? There are two conceivable
exceptions which might be taken by any defendant that suggest
themselves to this writer. First, the defendant may offer the objection of personal inconvenience; but the courts have shown this to be
an inconvenience that is reasonable. Moreover, answering to any
suit whatsoever involves the element of inconvenience, the differentiation being a matter of degree; and if it is reasonable there can be
no personal objection, for the public as a whole is served. Secondly,
the defendant may complain that as a citizen of state X he may be
summoned by substituted service for doing an act in state Y by virtue
of a statute in force in the latter, while if he were a citizen of state Y
and were to do the same act in X he would not be subject to service,
either because X has no statute or because the statute is very narrow
"Goodman v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 218 Iowa 529, 255 N. W.
667 (1934); the court stated that it rested its opinion upon the decision it had rendered in the "identical" case (involving a like action
against the same defendant) of Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co.,
214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932) in which it quoted sec. 90 of the
Restatement, Conflict of Laws infra, n. 15.
21
Restatement, Conflict of Laws (Tentative draft 1925) sec. 90.
Except for a slight change in wording this same provision appears in
the Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) at sec. 84.
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in scope. Here is a practical objection which might be removed by
the adoption of a uniform act.
It is submitted, therefore, that the statutes relating to jurisdiction
over nonresidents should undergo study and revision by a national
committee; that the revised statutes should employ the doing of an
act theory as one of the bases upon which nonresidents are to be subjected to the jurisdiction of courts at the locus of the wrong, for the
reasons previously pointed out; and, finally, that such a model
statutory section, thus compiled, should be presented in the form of a
uniform act" for adoption by all the states.
HOWARD E. TRENT, JR.
INTERPRETATION OF KENTUCKY STATUTES CONCERNING
DIVISION FENCES
At common law there was no duty upon the landowner to erect
and maintain fences between himself and his neighbor. Each
owner was bound at his peril to keep his cattle upon his own lands
whether the lands of his neighbors were fenced or unfenced.' However where an owner of land and his grantors have for more than
twenty years maintained a specific portion of a partition fence a
spurious kind of easement may arise by prescription.? The easement seems to be founded upon the duty which at common law
required the owner of a close at his peril to keep his cattle thereon,
and to prevent them from trespassing on an adjoining close; and
when the owner of the latter erected a fence for his protection, and
maintained it for the prescriptive period, he was deemed to have
discharged his neighbor from his original duty, and to have become
bound to protect his own close.?
In Kentucky the matter of division fences, their construction
and maintenance is governed by statute. Section 1784 of the Kentucky Statutes applies to improved lands and provides:
"When a division fence is desirable, or is made necessary by
the division of improved or enclosed lands, or no fence or division
fence exists between the improved or enclosed lands of adjoining
owners . . . either party may after he has built a lawful fence
upon his portion of the line require the other to erect a lawful
fence . . . upon his portion of the line . . . and if he fails
to do so, after three months notice, in writing, may erect such
fence, and the cost of erecting such fence shall constitute a lien,
superior to all others, upon the land of the recusant in favor of
the party erecting such fence, and shall be enforced as other
liens."'
" For an interesting discussion of uniform acts and their desirability, see Williston, Life and Law (1940) 217-219.
'Harper, Torts (1933) sec. 166.
2 Carter v. Riegel, 54 N. J. L. 498, 24 Atl. 484
(1892).
'Carter v. Riegel, 54 N. J. L. 498, 24 AUt. 484 (1892); see note 68
Am. Dec. 626 at 628 (1885).
'Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin, 1936) sec. 1784.

